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Abstract:  
 
Purpose: This paper examines how firms of different sizes formulate and implement 
strategies to achieve fit with an external environment disrupted by a geopolitical event. The 
context of the study is the pharmaceutical industry and how it managed the supply chain 
uncertainty created by the United Kingdom’s decision to leave the European Union, or 
Brexit. 
Design/methodology/approach: Data were collected longitudinally from the pro-Brexit 
vote on 23rd June 2016, until the UKs departure from the EU on 31st January 2020. Twenty-
seven interviews were conducted in the pharmaceutical sector, including nineteen 
interviews with senior managers at eight case companies and eight interviews with experts 
working for trade associations and standards institutes. The interview findings were 
triangulated with Brexit policy and strategy documentation. 
Findings: When formulating strategy, multi-national enterprises (MNEs) used worst case 
assumptions, while large firms, and small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) gathered 
knowledge as part of a ‘wait-and-see’ strategy, allowing them to reduce perceptions of 
heightened supply chain uncertainty. Firms then implemented reactive and/or proactive 
strategies to mitigate supply chain risks. 
Originality/Value: The study elaborates on strategic contingency theory by identifying two 
important conditions for achieving strategic fit: first, companies deploy intangible 
resources, such as management time, to gather information and reduce perceptions of 
heightened supply chain uncertainty. Second, companies deploy tangible resources (supply 
chain redundancies, new supply chain assets) to lessen the negative outcomes of supply 
chain risks. Managers are provided with an empirical framework for mitigating supply chain 
uncertainty and risk originating from geopolitical disruptions.  
 
Key Words: Supply chain risk management, supply chain uncertainty, contingency theory, 
geopolitical risks 
 
  
1. Introduction 
Geopolitical events can significantly disrupt supply chains (Hendry et al., 2019; 
Simangunsong et al., 2012). Witness the trade dispute between the Chinese and the United 
States governments in 2019 that prompted companies to rethink sourcing strategies and the 
location of manufacturing facilities (Financial Times, 2019). Or, the 2019 political protests 
in Hong Kong that shut down the city centre and disrupted transportation networks (The 
Economist, 2019a). Due to the increasing regularity of disruptive geopolitical events (World 
Economic Forum, 2020), a firm’s competitive priority becomes formulating and 
implementing strategies that achieve fit between the organisation and an uncertain business 
environment (Miller, 1992; Miller and Friesen, 1983; Venkatraman, 1989). 
Importantly, the need to achieve fit is not confined to the boundaries of the firm. Supply 
chains regularly criss-cross political borders, exposing buyers and suppliers to significant 
uncertainty from geopolitical disruptions. Supply chain uncertainty is defined as 
uncertainties that may occur at any point within a global supply chain network, leading to 
positive or negative outcomes (Simangunsong et al., 2012 p. 4494; Wagner and Bode, 
2008). While many disruptive events are beyond a manager’s direct control, negative 
outcomes can be indirectly mitigated by deploying resources to produce a desired change in 
the external environment (Luthans and Stewart, 1977; Thompson, 1967). For example, a 
manager can recruit knowledgeable staff who have an in-depth understanding of changing 
markets (Burns and Stalker, 1994), or collaborate with suppliers who have detailed 
knowledge of emerging technologies (Lawson and Potter, 2012). 
However, cash, people, and equipment tend be tied up in on-going projects, making it 
challenging for managers to deploy resources at short notice when a disruption occurs 
(George, 2005). It is firms with organisational slack that can deploy resources quickly in 
response to environmental fluctuations (Sharfman et al., 1988; Thompson, 1967). Resource 
slack is defined as potentially utilisable resources that can be diverted or redeployed for the 
achievement of organisational goals (George, 2005 p. 661). Firm size has been directly 
correlated with the amount of resource slack within the firm (George, 2005 p. 674); this is 
because larger firms have greater physical and financial capacity to hold excess resources 
than smaller firms (George, 2005; Sharfman et al., 1988).  
The supply chain uncertainty literature has explored how firms redeploy resources and 
reconfigure supply chain assets to build resilience against supply chain disruptions 
(Ambulkar et al., 2015; Hendry et al., 2019; de Sá et al., 2019). In addition, the supply chain 
risk management (SCRM) literature has shed light on how firms deploy tangible resources 
to mitigate risks related to natural disasters (Elluru et al., 2017; de Sá et al., 2019), terrorist 
attacks (Knemeyer et al., 2009), supplier insolvencies (Thun and Hoenig, 2011), and 
financial crises (Blome and Schoenherr, 2011). Addressed in less detail is how firms 
formulate and implement strategies to achieve fit with an external business environment 
disrupted by geopolitical events. Developing such an understanding is important because 
geopolitical disruptions can impede the flow of information and materials at borders and 
ports, and lead to increased costs from tariff and non-tariff barriers (Cáceres and Ear, 2012). 
The purpose of this paper is to answer the following research questions: 
 
o RQ1: How do firms formulate and implement strategies to manage the supply chain 
uncertainty arising from a geopolitical disruption?  
o RQ2: How does firm size affect the formulation and implementation of strategies to 
achieve fit with an external business environment disrupted by a geopolitical event? 
 
We examine these questions through a strategic contingency theory lens (Dess et al., 
1997; Miller, 1992; Miller and Friesen, 1983; Venkatraman, 1989) and by adopting a theory 
elaboration approach (Ketokivi and Choi, 2014). The study was situationally grounded in 
the context of pharmaceutical firms managing supply chain uncertainty arising from the 
political decision made by United Kingdom (UK) voters to leave the European Union (EU), 
or Brexit. Studying Brexit permits an examination of a significant geopolitical event in real-
time, one that affects almost every aspect of the supply chain from the positioning of supply 
chain assets, material and information flows, to human resource availability and access to 
suppliers (Hendry et al., 2019). We confine our examination to the pharmaceutical sector to 
control for industry effects, and because this sector has been profoundly influenced by UK 
and EU policy decisions related to Brexit. Data are collected longitudinally; from the time 
of the vote on 23rd June 2016 until the UK’s departure from the EU on 31st January 2020. 
Nineteen interviews were held with senior managers at eight case companies in the 
pharmaceutical sector and triangulated with eight expert interviews from pharmaceutical 
trade associations and standards institutes. The interview findings were then triangulated 
with secondary Brexit policy and strategy documentation.  
The remainder of the paper is organised in five sections. In the next section, we use a 
strategic contingency theory lens to examine supply chain uncertainty and risk. Section 3 
provides a justification for the research design, while Section 4 discusses the findings. 
Section 5 compares the study’s findings to the existing literature to arrive at an empirically 
informed framework consisting of four propositions. The framework sets out how firms 
formulate strategies to manage supply chain uncertainty and subsequently deploy intangible 
and tangible resources to mitigate supply chain risk. The paper concludes by outlining the 
study’s theoretical and managerial contributions and highlighting potential avenues for 
future research.  
 
2. Theoretical Background and Literature Review 
2.1 Strategic Contingency Theory 
Uncertainty is defined as “an individual’s perceived [in]ability to predict outcomes in the 
general business environment accurately because of insufficient information or the inability 
to discriminate between relevant and irrelevant data” (Milliken, 1987, p. 136). This 
definition suggests that the amount of uncertainty that a firm experiences is influenced by a 
decision maker’s perception as they attempt to organise and evaluate environmental stimuli 
and make sense of incoming information (Downey and Slocum, 1975). In early writings, 
organisational theorists explored how firms could achieve fit between organisational 
structure and the external environmental context to reduce uncertainty and improve 
corporate performance, in what is now termed ‘structural’ contingency theory (Burns and 
Stalker, 1994; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Thompson, 1967).  
Strategy theorists countered that while structure is one device to facilitate the handling 
of information about the external business environment, the strategy making process is 
another (Miller and Friesen, 1983). They argued that different levels of environmental 
variation require different degrees of strategy formulation to match organisational resources 
with opportunities and threats in the external business environment (Andrews, 1987; Hofer, 
1977; Venkatraman, 1989). This notion of ‘strategic’ contingency theory proposed that the 
process of achieving fit begins with aligning the company to its marketplace; it is this 
process of alignment that defines the company’s strategy (Dess et al., 1997; Miles and Snow, 
1994; Miller and Friesen, 1983; Venkatraman, 1989). The desire to change a firm’s strategic 
direction is motivated by alterations in external contingences linked to the general and local 
environment, as well as internal contingences related to input resources, business 
competencies, and the firm’s current strategy (Miller and Friesen, 1983; Zajac et al., 2000).  
Theoretical and practical contributions to contingency theory are achieved by first 
identifying important contingency variables that distinguish between contexts, then by 
grouping different contexts based on these contingency variables, and finally by 
determining the most effective organisational response to each major group (Sousa and 
Voss, 2008). Contingency variables can be grouped into four broad categories; national 
context and culture, firm size, strategic context, and other internal organisational context 
variables (Ketokivi and Schroeder, 2004; Sousa and Voss, 2008). To bound the scope of 
this paper and answer the research questions, we focus on firm size and strategic context as 
our contingency variables. Specifically, we seek to understand the interaction between firm 
size and strategic context when formulating and implementing strategy to achieve fit with 
an external environment disrupted by a geopolitical event. 
A key premise of strategic contingency theory is that strategic fit is organisationally and 
temporally unique, rather than common across many organisations in a given context (Zajac 
et al., 2000). Strategic change that leads to fit with one contingency variable but significantly 
decreases fit with other contingency variables will not lead to performance benefits for the 
firm (Zajac et al., 2000). A strategic misfit occurs when an organisation is not able to change, 
often due to insufficient resources, an unwillingness to change, or even an unawareness of 
the need to change in the face of environmental shifts (Henderson and Clark, 1990; Leonard-
Barton, 1990; Zajac et al., 2000). When a firm has appropriate and sufficient resources, 
these resources can be bundled and deployed to drive strategic change (Miller, 1992; Zajac 
et al., 2000). 
However, these resources must first be freely available, in the form of organisational 
slack (Cheng and Kesner, 1997). Slack resources can be tangible or intangible (George, 
2005). Tangible resources are measurable; they relate to investments where it is possible to 
calculate both the input cost and the financial outcomes of the investment (Hadjikhani, 
1997). They include fixed assets, such as spare capacity in manufacturing facilities, excess 
vehicles, and unused space in distribution facilities (Modi and Mishra, 2011), and variable 
assets, such as surplus raw materials, temporary labour, and excess inventory (Modi and 
Mishra, 2011). Decisions on where to deploy fixed assets tend to be made at the strategic 
level of the firm because of the high cost and longer term nature of the decision (Allaoui et 
al., 2019). Decisions on the deployment of variables assets are made on a short-term, semi-
regular basis at the operational level of the firm (Allaoui et al., 2019). Intangible resources, 
on the other hand, are difficult to quantify. They are relationship specific and are difficult 
to redeploy to another relationship (Figueira-de-Lemos et al., 2011). Examples of intangible 
resources include knowledge gathering, searching for information, relationship building, 
and allocating management time to understand and reduce the uncertainty faced by the 
organisation (Surroca et al., 2010). Search and knowledge gathering activities have been 
shown to help firms better anticipate, and even avoid, risks linked to supply chain 
disruptions (Braunscheidel and Suresh, 2009). 
  
2.2 Supply Chain Risk and Uncertainty  
2.2.1 Passive SCRM strategies 
Supply chain risk is defined as “the likelihood and impact of unexpected macro, and/or 
micro level events or conditions that adversely influence any part of a supply chain leading 
to operational, tactical, or strategic level failures or irregularities” (Ho et al., 2015, p.5035). 
SCRM strategies are typically categorised as proactive, reactive, or passive (Grotsch et al., 
2013). Passiveness implies doing nothing until the risk event manifests and then reacting 
chaotically and aimlessly after the event (Grotsch et al., 2013). Passive SCRM strategies 
receive very limited attention in the supply chain risk literature and are considered the 
weakest form of counteracting supply chain risk, with outcomes mainly subject to chance 
(Grotsch et al., 2013).  
 
2.2.2 Reactive SCRM strategies 
A review of the SCRM literature highlights ambiguity on the exact nature of reactive 
strategies. One group of scholars suggest that reactive strategies are characterised by 
measures taken in advance of the event to reduce its severity (Chopra and Sodhi, 2004; 
Grotsch et al., 2013; Jüttner et al., 2003; Thun and Hoenig, 2011), while other authors argue 
that reactiveness refers to the post-disruption phase, where companies focus on recovering 
quickly and returning to a desired state (Ali et al., 2017; Brandon-Jones et al., 2014). There 
is also dispute surrounding the nature of the response. One group of authors focuses on 
building redundancies in the form of excess inventory and surplus capacity to reduce the 
severity of the event (Chopra and Sodhi, 2004; Kwak et al., 2018; Sheffi and Rice, 2005; 
Thun et al., 2011), while other scholars suggest that reactive strategies include moving 
production quantities and inventory to different manufacturing facilities to avoid the 
disruption entirely (Tang and Tomlin, 2008). Still other authors stress that companies should 
increase capacity in the transportation network (Jüttner et al., 2003; Tang and Musa, 2011), 
or embed flexibility in the manufacturing and distribution process to enable a quick response 
(Craighead et al., 2007; Jüttner et al., 2003; Sánchez and Pérez, 2005; Stevenson and Spring, 
2007; Tang and Tomlin, 2008).  
A common theme running throughout this discourse is that a reactive SCRM strategy 
includes the deployment of fixed and variable assets to reduce the severity of the disruption. 
What is disputed is when a company’s intervention should occur (before or after the event) 
and the organisational level at which the decision to intervene is made. To provide clarity, 
we offer the following definition of reactive SCRM strategies:  
 
Tactical and operational decisions that lead to tangible investments in variable 
assets aimed at reducing the severity of a risk event.  
 
This definition stresses that reactive strategies are applied before the risk event and 
encompass tactical and/or operational decisions to reduce the severity, but not the 
probability, of a disruptive event. As investments are in variable, and not fixed, assets, the 
decision is typically made at the operational or mid-management level of the firm, and not 
by senior managers at the strategic level (Allaoui et al., 2019). 
 
2.2.3 Proactive SCRM strategies 
Proactive SCRM strategies tend to refer to the commitment of fixed assets into new 
facilities, supplier contracts, or risk monitoring systems (Elluru et al., 2017; Knemeyer et 
al., 2009). For example, proactive strategies may include multi-sourcing/dual sourcing 
strategies (Craighead et al., 2007; Jüttner et al., 2003; Norrman and Jansson, 2004), and 
sharing and transferring risk to supply chain partners (Tang and Tomlin, 2008). Proactive 
strategies can also include extending existing storage and distribution facilities or moving 
supply chain facilities away from high risk locations (Knemeyer et al., 2009). Proactiveness 
may also include hedging against financial risks (Blome and Schoenherr, 2011; Hendricks 
and Singhal, 2003, 2005), investing in enterprise risk management systems (Grotsch et al., 
2013), or planning software and systems (Huang et al., 2009; Knemeyer et al., 2009).  
Grotsch et al. (2013) suggests that proactive strategies are expressed in two dimensions: 
1) actions taken before the event to reduce the probability that the risk occurs; and 2) actions 
taken in advance to reduce the impact of the risk event when it occurs. However, this 
definition is equivocal because attempting to reduce the severity of an event overlaps with 
reactive strategies. To provide clarity, we define proactive SCRM strategies as:  
 
Strategic decisions that lead to tangible investments in fixed assets that change the 
supply chain network architecture and reduce or eliminate the probability of a risk event. 
 
Our definition stresses that proactive strategies are strategic decisions made to deploy 
fixed assets with the aim of reducing the probability, but not the severity, of a disruptive 
event. 
  
 2.2.4 Supply Chain Uncertainty  
The supply chain uncertainty literature tends to focus on the reconfiguration of tangible 
resources, such as inventory and supply chain assets, to build resilience against negative 
outcomes of supply chain disruptions (Ambulkar et al., 2015; Brandon-Jones et al., 2014; 
de Sá et al., 2019). For example, Flynn et al. (2016) find that the negative outcomes of 
supply chain uncertainty can be managed through integrating supply chain processes and 
organisational structure to achieve alignment with the external environment. Other authors 
stress the importance of intangible resources in minimising the negative effects of supply 
chain disruptions, including lobbying governments and identifying new business 
opportunities (Hendry et al., 2019), or building internal social capital to build resilience 
through a firm’s human resources (Polyviou et al., 2019).  
The lines between SCRM and supply chain uncertainty often become blurred as both 
literatures concentrate on how firms deploy resources to avoid or mitigate negative 
outcomes of supply chain disruptions (see Ho et al., 2015; Thun et al., 2011; Trkman and 
McCormack, 2009). However, risk and uncertainty are distinct concepts. Risk describes 
decision situations in which probabilities are available to guide choice, while uncertainty 
describes decision situations in which information is too imprecise to be summarised by 
probabilities (Knight, 1921). Risk is therefore a consequence of uncertainty and not a 
substitute for it (March and Shapira, 1987). By extension, supply chain risks arise due to 
perceived uncertainty in the external business environment. To gain a better understanding 
of how perceptions of heightened uncertainty can be reduced, we now turn to the field of 
International Business. 
 
2.2.5 Wait-and-see strategies 
International Business scholars divide uncertainty into pure and contingent uncertainty 
(Figueira-de-Lemos et al., 2011). While pure uncertainty refers to future events that are 
impossible to know and plan for, contingent uncertainty implies that the more an individual 
learns, the more that individual can do to develop different contingency plans (Jones, 2013). 
When contingent uncertainty is high, managers are often reluctant to make tangible resource 
commitments because there is too much at stake and such decisions are difficult and costly 
to reverse (Figueira-de-Lemos and Hadjikhani, 2014). Instead, managers are more likely to 
make intangible resource commitments to gain knowledge about the situation – termed a 
‘wait-and-see’ strategy (Hadjikhani, 1997; Sull, 2005).  
A wait-and-see strategy is defined as “a measured decision to make intangible resource 
commitments to gather knowledge about the disruptive event and reduce contingent 
uncertainty” (Clarke and Liesch, 2017, p. 924). Managers operating in turbulent markets 
cannot create the timing of the rare golden opportunity, nor can they predict with any 
certainty the exact nature of a disruptive event; they therefore have to wait-and-see for such 
situations to become apparent (Sull, 2005). With a wait-and-see strategy, the company 
aligns its strategic focus to the particular market context, and reacts according to the present 
situation as-is, be it an opportunity or threat, without making tangible resource commitments 
(Clarke and Liesch, 2017; Sull, 2005). The company commits intangible resources to gather 
new knowledge by forming new, or strengthening existing, relationships with other actors 
in the supply chain (Hadjikhani, 1997; Sull, 2005). 
The concept of wait-and-see goes largely undiscussed by SCRM and supply chain 
uncertainty scholars, even though it is distinct from passive, reactive, and proactive 
strategies. A wait-and-see strategy is not proactive because tangible resource commitments 
are not made in advance to reduce the probability of the disruptive event occurring. Nor is 
it reactive, as tangible resources are not committed to reduce the severity of the event. 
Moreover, a wait-and-see strategy is not passive, because the firm does not stand idly by as 
the disruptive event happens and react haphazardly after the event. Instead, a wait-and-see 
strategy is the deliberate commitment of intangible resources to acquire knowledge about 
the disruptive event to reduce contingent uncertainty (Clarke and Liesch, 2017). Table 1 
provides a comparison of the four strategies for managing supply chain uncertainty and risk 
based on the intent, level of decision-making, timeframe, and resource commitment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: A comparison of Supply Chain Risk and Uncertainty Strategies 
  
Passive Strategy 
Definition A “do-nothing” approach where business carries on as usual until after the event has 
materialised (Grotsch et al., 2013). 
Decision Level No decisions until after the event. 
Resource 
Commitments 
No resource commitments are made until after the event. The company carries on business 
as usual (Grotsch et al., 2013). 
Strategy 
elements 
• Not taking any deliberate action in advance to address the disruptive event (Grotsch et 
al., 2013). 
• Taking action only after the event to minimise the disruption to the supply chain 
(Grotsch et al., 2013). 
• Business-as-usual (Grotsch et al., 2013). 
Reactive Strategy 
Definition Tactical and operational decisions that lead to tangible investments in variable assets aimed 
at reducing the severity of a risk event.  
Decision Level Operational and tactical. 
Resource 
Commitments 
• Investing in variable assets in a quantifiable way (tangible resource commitment into 
variable assets). 
Strategy 
elements 
• Building redundancies in the form of excess inventory and surplus capacity to reduce 
the severity of the event (Chopra and Sodhi, 2004; Kwak et al., 2018; Sheffi and Rice, 
2005; Thun et al., 2011).  
• Moving production quantities and inventory to different manufacturing facilities to 
avoid the disruption entirely (Tang and Tomlin, 2008). 
• Increasing capacity in the transportation network through additional modes of 
transportation or transportation providers (Jüttner et al., 2003; Tang and Musa, 2011). 
• Embedding flexibility in the manufacturing and distribution process to enable a quick 
response to supply chain disruptions (Craighead et al., 2007; Jüttner et al., 2003; 
Sánchez and Pérez, 2005; Stevenson and Spring, 2007; Tang and Tomlin, 2008). 
Proactive Strategy 
Definition Strategic decisions that lead to tangible investments in fixed assets that change the supply 
chain network to reduce or eliminate the probability of a risk event.  
Decision Level Strategic 
Resource 
Commitments 
Investing in fixed assets in a quantifiable way (tangible resource commitment into fixed 
assets). 
Strategy 
elements 
• Making new supplier contracts: multi-sourcing/dual sourcing (Craighead et al., 2007; 
Jüttner et al., 2003; Norrman and Jansson, 2004). 
• Extending existing storage and distribution facilities (Knemeyer et al., 2009). 
• Moving supply chain facilities away from high risk locations (Knemeyer et al., 2009). 
• Investing in enterprise risk management systems (Grotsch et al., 2013). 
• Hedging against financial risks (Blome and Schoenherr, 2011; Hendricks and Singhal, 
2003, 2005).  
• Using tools and software to identify risk (Huang et al., 2009; Knemeyer et al., 2009). 
Wait-and-See Strategy 
Definition A measured decision to make intangible resource commitments to acquire knowledge 
about the disruptive event, through building relationships with stakeholders, and reduce 
contingent uncertainty (Clarke and Liesch, 2017). 
Decision Level Data gathering for strategic, tactical, and operational decisions. 
Resource 
Commitments 
Intangible resource commitments. 
Strategy 
elements 
• Investing in relationships with suppliers, government bodies, trade associations, and 
policymakers to gather information about the disruptive event (Figueira-de-Lemos and 
Hadjikhani, 2014). 
• Knowledge gathering activities (Clarke and Liesch, 2017). 
• Making intangible/unquantifiable resource commitments. 
3. Research Design 
Our research strategy is based on a theory elaboration approach, which focuses on the 
contextualised logic of a general theory (Ketokivi and Choi, 2014). To elaborate on strategic 
contingency theory, we worked abductively (Niiniluoto, 1999), continuously moving 
between the empirical data and theory. While guided by a priori theoretical considerations, 
we remained open to unanticipated findings and the possibility that the general theory 
required reformulation (Merton, 1968). The study was situationally grounded in the context 
of pharmaceutical firms managing supply chain uncertainty arising from the pro-Brexit 
vote. 
The research design is based on a multiple case study of eight pharmaceutical 
companies; this allowed the phenomena of supply chain uncertainty to be studied within the 
context of a real-life geopolitical event: Brexit. This study spans the Brexit process from the 
day of the pro-Brexit vote on 23rd June 2016 to the departure of the UK from the EU on 31st 
January 2020. Case selection used theoretical replication logic, in which cases are expected 
to provide different findings for explainable reasons (Yin, 2014) based on company size. 
We selected three multinational enterprises (MNEs), three large firms, and two SME 
companies from the domain of pharmaceutical companies in the UK. Throughout the study, 
we attempted to reconcile the idiosyncrasies of the data with strategic contingency theory 
and, when unanticipated findings were identified, we elaborated theory (Ketokivi and Choi, 
2014). Next, the context of the study is introduced. 
 
3.1 Context of Study: Brexit and the Pharmaceutical Industry 
On 23rd June 2016, the people of the United Kingdom voted on whether to remain in, or to 
leave, the European Union (EU). The vote was 51.9% in favour of the UK departing the 
EU, with the outcome creating a profound sense of surprise and shock on both sides of the 
debate (Wincott, 2017). In the aftermath of the vote, Britain’s Prime Minister, David 
Cameron, resigned and the Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) 250 index fell by 13% 
(Rodionova, 2016). David Davis, the then Secretary of State for Exiting the European 
Union, described Brexit as the “biggest change for a generation” (Wincott, 2017), while 
other sources claimed Brexit to be “the most difficult public policy challenge faced by the 
UK since World War II” (Washington Post, 2018).  
On 29th March 2017, the new UK Prime Minister, Theresa May, triggered Article 50, 
giving the UK two years to negotiate an exit deal with the 27 remaining EU member states. 
By 18th November 2017, over 500 days had passed since the Brexit referendum and fewer 
than 500 days were left until Britain was due to leave the EU, yet negotiations were still 
agonisingly slow (The Economist, 2017). At that point, it was still unclear whether the 
European Council would agree to begin the second phase of talks on transitional 
arrangements and future trade relations, with frustrated pro-Brexiteers increasingly 
advocating to walk away from the negotiation table with no deal at all (The Economist, 
2017). A year later, on 26th November 2018, Theresa May returned from Brussels with a 
negotiated agreement that spelled out the UK’s withdrawal terms. She warned members of 
the UK parliament that not agreeing to the withdrawal deal would lead to further division 
and uncertainty across the UK (BBC.co.uk, 2018). On 16th January 2019, she put the deal 
to the UK House of Commons in a meaningful vote that was rejected by 432 to 202 votes 
(www.parliament.uk, 2019). During February and the early weeks of March 2019, Theresa 
May renegotiated the withdrawal agreement with her EU counterparts to secure more 
favourable terms. She put the withdrawal agreement to the UK parliament in a second 
meaningful vote on 12th March 2019; it was again rejected, by 391 to 242 votes (The 
Economist, 2019b). Two days later, a vote by the parliament moved the date of departure 
from 31st March 2019 to 30th June 2019. This date was then subsequently extended by 
Brussels until 31st October 2019, prolonging the uncertainty for UK businesses (The 
Guardian, 2019).  
After being elected as the leader of the Conservative Party, Boris Johnson pledged to 
“get Brexit done” by 31st October. However, Parliament’s support was not forthcoming and 
instead he secured yet another extension to 31st January 2020. The Conservative Party called 
for, and won with a majority, the General Election on 12th December 2019, ensuring that 
the UK would depart the EU on 31st January 2020. At the time of writing this paper the 
government planned to complete trade negotiations during 2020, such that a trade agreement 
would be in place by 31st December 2020. 
The UK’s pharmaceutical industry is selected as the industry of study because it 
provides an ideal setting to explore how supply chains are affected by Brexit uncertainty. 
More than 2,600 pharmaceutical products have some stage of manufacture in Britain, and 
45 million patient packs are supplied from the UK to other European countries each month, 
with another 37 million packs flowing in the opposite direction (Reuters.com, 2018). When 
the European Medicines Agency (EMA) relocated its headquarters from London to 
Amsterdam in 2018, Britain became a so-called ‘third country’ for the purposes of 
medicines regulation, creating further uncertainty about the future process for drug 
approvals for UK pharmaceutical firms (Reuters.com, 2018). Strategically sensitive 
industries, including pharmaceuticals, were advised by UK regulators to implement no-deal 
plans by the end of 2017 (The Economist, 2017). Pharmaceutical companies were told “to 
ensure they have a minimum of six-weeks’ additional supply in the UK, over and above 
their business as usual operation buffer, by 29 March 2019” (Reuters.com, 2018). These 
new regulatory requirements and procedural changes impeded access to European markets 
and created high degrees of uncertainty for UK pharmaceutical firms (The Economist, 
2019b). 
 
3.2 Data Collection 
Qualitative data were gathered using the key informant technique (Marshall, 1996; 
Tremblay, 1957). As per Carter and Jennings (2002), we identified key informants by 
selecting senior level managers with at least three years’ experience and with a detailed 
understanding of the phenomenon under investigation. Interview data were collected 
longitudinally over a three-year period, from May 2017 to 31st January 2020, using 27 
interviews with 19 key informants. Six of the key informants were industry experts (coded 
as EXP), from four organisations) and the remaining thirteen worked in companies: 
multinational enterprises (coded as MNE, from three companies), large pharmaceutical 
companies (coded as LRG, from three companies), or small and medium sized enterprises 
(coded as SME, from two companies). Eight of the key informants were interviewed twice 
throughout the analysis period to capture the longitudinal effects of Brexit uncertainty as it 
unfolded. To protect the anonymity of the companies, we use codes such as MNE1, LRG2, 
or EXP3 to distinguish information collected from different organisations. We use codes 
such as MNE2a and MNE2b to distinguish key informants from the same organisation. 
Figure 1 provides an overview of when the interviews were conducted. 
 
Figure 1: Timing of longitudinal interviews with company senior managers and experts 
 
 Each interview lasted between thirty minutes and one hour and was transcribed verbatim 
for coding and analysis. The longitudinal analysis was split into three time periods, in 
conjunction with the key events of the Brexit phenomenon. We consider the long-term 
period to be from 23rd June 2016 (the date of vote) to 18th November 2017 (the halfway 
point between the vote and the date the UK was initially meant to leave the EU: 29th March 
2019). The medium-term period is from 19th November 2017 to 29th November 2018, the 
day Theresa May returned with the withdrawal deal from Brussels. The short-term period 
is from 30th November 2018 to 31st January 2020, the date that Britain officially left the EU.  
As per Sharfman et al. (1988), we used firm size as a proxy for resource slack. 
Information on firm size, including number of employees and annual revenue, was gathered 
from Marketline (2018) and FAME (2019) databases for the 2018-2019 fiscal year. The 
firm size categorisation was determined by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD, 2019) definitions; these categorise SMEs as having between 1-500 
employees and Large Organisations (LRG) as having 500+ employees. A Multi-National 
Enterprise (MNE) categorisation was added for organisations with 50,000+ employees and 
revenues exceeding $20+ billion, based on data from Statista (2019). As many of the large 
and MNE organisations are listed on US stock exchanges, we used the OECD US definition 
of firm size (OECD, 2019) (see Table 2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 No Org. Category Informant role 
Times 
interviewed 
Number of 
Employees Annual Revenue 
1 MNE1 Big Pharma 
MNE1: Head of Global Logistics and 
Warehousing 
2 
[50,000 - 100,000] USD [20, 60] billion 
2 MNE2 
Big Pharma 
MNE2a: Supply Chain Director 2 [50,000 - 100,000] USD [20, 60] billion 
3 MNE2 MNE2b: Marketing Manager 1 [50,000 - 100,000] USD [20, 60] billion 
4 MNE3 
Big Pharma 
MNE3a: Global Operations & Change Director 1 [50,000 - 100,000] USD [20, 60] billion 
5 MNE3 MNE3b: Quality Assurance Manager 1 [50,000 - 100,000] USD [20, 60] billion 
6 MNE3 MNE3c: Marketing Manager 1 [50,000 - 100,000] USD [20, 60] billion 
7 LRG1 
Large 
LRG1a: Supply Chain Director 2 [500 - 49,999] USD [10, 19] billion 
8 LRG1 LRG1b: Corporate Vice President Supply Chain 2 [500 - 49,999] USD [10, 19] billion 
9 LRG2 
Large 
LRG2a: CEO of Supply Chain Operations 1 [500 - 49,999] Not Available 
10 LRG2 LRG2b: Supply Chain Director 1 [500 - 49,999] Not Available 
11 LRG3 Large LRG3: Director of Supply Chain and Procurement 1 [500 - 49,999] USD [75, 100] million 
12 SME1 SME SME1: Operations Director 2 [100 - 499] USD [50, 74] million 
13 SME2 SME SME2: CEO 2 [100 - 499] USD [3, 10] million 
14 EXP1 
Trade & Policy 
Observatory EXP1: Professor of Economics 
1 
  
15 EXP2 Industry Consultancy EXP2: Managing Director 2   
16 EXP3 
Standards and Regulatory 
Body EXP3: Head of Pharmaceutical Standards 
2 
  
17 EXP4 
Pharmaceutical Trade 
Association 
EXP4a: Head of Manufacturing Technology 1   
18 EXP4 EXP4b: Head of Pharmaceutical Policy 1   
19 EXP4 EXP4c: Quality and Assurance Manager 1   
Table 2: Case study companies with firm size categorisation and key informant 
Interview findings were triangulated with findings from eight pharmaceutical industry 
expert interviews (see Table 2), and with secondary documentary evidence gathered from 
annual reports, Brexit strategy documentation, policy documentation from trade association 
websites and UK government websites (UK Industrial Strategy, 2019; www.parliament.uk, 
2019), and news websites/databases including Factiva, Bloomberg, Financial 
Times/FT.com, the Economist, and the Guardian. The respondent and method triangulation 
were undertaken to improve construct validity (Yin, 2014). 
 
3.3 Data Analysis 
The research team used thematic analysis techniques (Braun and Clarke, 2006) and followed 
the process outlined by Miles and Huberman (1994) for analysing qualitative interview data. 
A member of the research team performed first-level coding to summarise and describe the 
data. The same researcher then performed pattern matching techniques (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994; Yin, 2014) to group similar codes together and attached these codes to the 
higher order themes (strategies) previously defined from the literature. The coding process 
was then repeated by two other members of the research team to enhance reliability 
(Armstrong et al., 1997). The coding scheme was compared between the three members of 
the team and changed in an iterative fashion until consensus was reached on the key themes 
to emerge from the data (Armstrong et al., 1997). The re-coding of the data resulted in close 
agreement on the primary themes and helped to strengthen the rigour of the qualitative data 
analysis process (Armstrong et al., 1997). The coding identifiers are shown in the Appendix 
as they closely follow the literature review summarised in Table 1. They were used to 
identify passages of text that could be linked to the strategies of passive, wait-and-see, 
reactive, and proactive. When passages of text were identified that did not fit the coding 
identifiers, we created new themes, allowing us to elaborate on strategic contingency theory. 
Finally, the findings were formalised and systemised into propositions that explain how 
companies achieve strategic fit and reduce perceived supply chain uncertainty. We 
employed both forward and backward extrapolation to identify strategies of the companies 
in the long, medium, and short term, based on their responses to questions where they 
specified what had been done in the past and plans for the future to manage the uncertainty 
arising from Brexit. 
 
4. Findings 
The companies in our study followed a variety of strategies to achieve strategic fit. Table 3 
shows the coding identifiers used to determine the strategy that firms’ followed.    
Strategy Code and Short-Meaning Definition from the paper 
Passive Pas-1: No action Not taking any deliberate action in advance to address the disruptive event (Grotsch et al., 2013). 
  Pas-2: Action after Taking action only after the event to minimise the disruption to the supply chain (Grotsch et al., 2013). 
  Pas-3: Business-as-usual Continuing to operate business-as-usual (Grotsch et al., 2013). 
  Pas-Other Use this code only if text does not fit above definitions. 
Wait-and-See Wai-1: Relationships with Suppliers Investing in relationships with suppliers to gather information about the event (Clarke and Liesch, 2017). 
  
Wai-2: Relationships with 
Government 
Investing in relationships with government bodies and policy-makers to gather information about the 
disruptive event (Figueira-de-Lemos and Hadjikhani, 2014). 
  
Wai-3: Relationships with Trade 
Associations 
Investing in relationships with trade associations to gather information about the disruptive event (Figueira-
de-Lemos and Hadjikhani, 2014). 
  Wai-4: Intangible commitment Making intangible/unquantifiable resource commitments. 
  Wai-Other  Use this code only if it is absolutely necessary. 
Reactive Rea-1: Safety stock Building safety inventory (Chopra and Sodhi, 2004; Knemeyer et al., 2009; Sheffi and Rice, 2005). 
  Rea-2: Production Moving production quantities to different manufacturing facilities (Tang and Tomlin, 2008). 
  Rea-3: Inventory routing Shifting inventory to different distribution and warehousing facilities (Tang and Tomlin, 2008). 
  Rea-4: Transport network capacity 
Increasing capacity in transportation network through additional modes of transportation or transportation 
providers (Jüttner et al., 2003; Tang and Musa, 2011). 
  Rea-5: Variable assets Investing in variable assets in a quantifiable way (tangible resource commitment into variable resources). 
  Rea-6: Operational and tactical Taking operational and tactical decisions in response to the event. 
  Rea-Other  Use this code only if text does not fit above definitions. 
Proactive Pro-1: Risk sharing Sharing and transferring risk to supply chain partners (Tang and Tomlin, 2008). 
  Pro-2: Multi-sourcing 
Making new supplier contracts: multi-sourcing/dual sourcing (Craighead et al., 2007; Jüttner et al., 2003; 
Norrman and Jansson, 2004). 
  Pro-3: Expanding physical network Extending existing storage and distribution facilities (Knemeyer et al., 2009). 
  Pro-4: Relocating fixed assets Moving supply chain facilities away from high risk locations (Knemeyer et al., 2009). 
  Pro-5: Enterprise Risk Investing in enterprise risk management and systems (Grotsch et al., 2013). 
  Pro-6: Financial Risks Hedging against financial risks (Blome and Schoenherr, 2011; Hendricks and Singhal, 2003, 2005).  
  Pro-7: Risk Tools and Software Using tools and software to identify risk (Huang et al., 2009; Knemeyer et al., 2009). 
  Pro-8: Fixed Assets Investing in fixed assets in a quantifiable way (tangible resource commitment into fixed assets). 
  Pro-9: Strategic Decisions Taking strategic decisions. 
  Pro-Other Use this code only if text does not fit above definitions. 
Table 3: Coding identifiers and examples from the literature 
 
Table 4 provides the coding results and the different strategies used by firms over the long, 
medium and short term. The [B] and the [F] in some of the cells of Table 4 indicate the 
responses given by the companies on what they have done in the past ([B for backward 
extrapolation]) and what they plan to do in the future ([F for forward extrapolation]) in 
addition to what they are doing currently. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Size 
Time Period 
Long Term Medium Term Short Term 
23rd June 2016 to 18th Nov 2017 18th Nov 2017 to 29th Nov 2018 30th Nov 2018 to 31st Jan 2020 
MNE1 WAIT-AND-SEE STRATEGY: 
Wai-1: Talking to supply base about 
the impacts of doing many customs 
declarations a year. 
Wai-4: Assumed World Trade 
Organization and non-mutual 
recognition of quality standards. 
 
REACTIVE STRATEGY: 
Rea-2: Production network is 
flexible where more than one 
factory makes a given product and 
UK/EU production can be moved. 
Rea-4: Ensuring sufficient transport 
capacity into and from the UK. 
REACTIVE STRATEGY: 
Rea-1: Have high stocks of life-saving products and will 
build more. Optimising stocks of revenue critical products. 
Rea-4: Setting up new routings with our transport 
organisations. 
Rea-6: Updating systems to produce customs documents 
for the UK/EU trade. 
 
PROACTIVE STRATEGY: 
Pro-3: Establishing warehouse in the UK to store the 
product for UK patients, while the EU warehouse will 
sample products made in the UK and destined for the EU 
27. 
Pro-4: Setting up a Quality Processing hub in Ireland for 
all of the EU quality release. 
REACTIVE STRATEGY [F]: 
Rea-1: Building an extra several weeks’ inventory in the 
UK, of all non-EU and all EU manufactured products. 
Rea-4: Setting up new routings with our transport 
organisations. 
Rea-6: Updating systems to produce customs documents 
for the UK/EU trade. 
 
PROACTIVE STRATEGY [F]: 
Pro-3: Establishing warehouse in UK to store the 
product for UK patients, while the EU warehouse will 
sample products made in the UK and destined for the EU 
27. 
Pro-4: Setting up a Quality Processing hub in Ireland for 
all of the EU quality release. 
MNE2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MNE2 
WAIT-AND-SEE STRATEGY: 
Wai-1: Talking to suppliers about 
regulations around importing 
chemicals into UK and how these 
might change. 
Wai-3: Interaction with ABPI as the 
sole industry communication to the 
government. 
 
REACTIVE STRATEGY: 
Rea 2: Production network is 
flexible where more than one 
factory makes a given product and 
UK/EU production can be moved. 
WAIT-AND-SEE STRATEGY: 
Wai-1: Talking to UK contract manufacturing companies 
about Quality Release into EU and their ability to build 
higher stock levels of products. 
Wai-2: Lobbying government through industry groups and 
providing data to government on inventory levels and 
locations. 
 
REACTIVE STRATEGY: 
Rea-1: Stocking an extra 6 weeks of inventory on products 
as instructed by the government. 
Rea-3: Suppliers positioning stocks of raw materials. 
Rea-4: Establishing additional UK inbound port logistics 
routes. 
Rea-5: Establishing systems for Quality Release in EU. 
Packaging suppliers implementing artwork changes due to 
REACTIVE STRATEGY [F]: 
Rea-1: Stocking an extra 6 weeks of inventory on 
products as instructed by the government and to buffer 
against customs delays. 
Rea-3: Suppliers positioning stocks of raw materials. 
Rea-4: Establishing additional UK inbound port logistics 
routes. 
Rea-5: Establishing systems for Quality Release in EU. 
Packaging suppliers implementing artwork changes due 
to changes in legal entities and need for separate UK/EU 
packaging. 
 
PROACTIVE STRATEGY [F]:  
Pro-2: Vaccines produced in UK are being moved to 
EU. 
Pro 3: Keeping UK warehouse open (that would 
otherwise have closed) for additional storage capacity. 
Size 
Time Period 
Long Term Medium Term Short Term 
23rd June 2016 to 18th Nov 2017 18th Nov 2017 to 29th Nov 2018 30th Nov 2018 to 31st Jan 2020 
changes in legal entities and need for separate UK/EU 
packaging. 
 
PROACTIVE STRATEGY:  
Pro-2: Vaccines produced in UK are being moved to EU. 
Pro-6: Moved Euro bank accounts to EU. 
 
MNE3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MNE3 
WAIT-AND-SEE STRATEGY: 
Wai-3: Corresponding with trade 
associations. 
Wai 4: Some financial planning on 
Brexit implications. 
 
WAIT-AND-SEE STRATEGY: 
Wai-1: Conducting extensive supplier readiness 
programme with tier 1 and tier 2 suppliers on aspects such 
as import and export, CE marking. 
Wai-3: Working with trade associations to give them the 
information they need to lobby the government. 
Wai-4: Conducted a what-if style workshop at senior 
management level to understand the implications of Brexit 
and questions to ask. 
 
REACTIVE STRATEGY: 
Rea-1: Building extra product inventory, anything between 
4 weeks and 6 months. 
Rea-3: Shifting product inventory closer to market. 
Rea-4: Establishing additional UK inbound sea-port 
logistics routes. 
 
PROACTIVE STRATEGY:  
Pro-3: Procuring importation clearance capacity in the UK 
in terms of a bonded facility. 
Pro-9: Diverting existing strategic infrastructure 
programmes and accelerating others. 
 
REACTIVE STRATEGY [F]: 
Rea-1: Building extra product inventory, between 4 
weeks and 6 months. 
Rea 3: Shifting product inventory closer to market. 
Rea 4: Establishing additional UK inbound sea-port 
logistics routes. 
 
PROACTIVE STRATEGY [F]:  
Pro-3: Procuring importation clearance capacity in the 
UK in terms of a bonded facility. 
Pro 9: Diverting existing strategic infrastructure 
programmes and accelerating others. 
 
LRG1 WAIT-AND-SEE STRATEGY 
[B]: 
WAIT-AND-SEE STRATEGY: 
Wai-1: Discussing customs clearance issues with logistics 
provider. 
REACTIVE STRATEGY: 
Rea-1: Ensuring additional 6 to 8 weeks of product 
inventory is in the UK 3 months before 29th March, and 
Size 
Time Period 
Long Term Medium Term Short Term 
23rd June 2016 to 18th Nov 2017 18th Nov 2017 to 29th Nov 2018 30th Nov 2018 to 31st Jan 2020 
Wai-1: Discussing customs 
clearance issues with logistics 
provider. 
 
Wai-2: Government are requesting an extra 6 weeks 
product inventory. 
 
REACTIVE STRATEGY: 
Rea-1: Building additional 6 to 8 weeks of product 
inventory in the UK and buffered some materials exported 
from the UK to the EU. 
Rea-2: Ensuring capacity for local as well as global 
manufacturing of products, for UK for responsive supply. 
Rea-3: Establishing separate inventories and transportation 
routes, for Ireland. 
Rea-4: Finalising air freight routes into the UK to avoid 
congested ports. 
 
PROACTIVE STRATEGY:  
Pro-2: Possible dual supply of some raw materials from the 
UK being established in the EU. 
Pro 6: Always considering the financial currency 
implications of establishing high stocks in the UK. 
 
then maintaining these stocks and buffering against panic 
buying. 
Rea-2: Ensuring capacity for local as well as global 
manufacturing of products, for UK for responsive 
supply. 
Rea-3: Establishing separate inventories and 
transportation routes, for Ireland. 
Rea-4: Established air freight routes into the UK to avoid 
congested ports. 
 
PROACTIVE STRATEGY:  
Pro-2: Seeking dual supply of some raw materials from 
the UK being established in the EU. Established new 
supplier for CE marking in Germany. 
Pro 6: Always considering the financial currency 
implications of establishing high stocks in the UK. 
 
LRG2 WAIT-AND-SEE STRATEGY 
[B]: 
Wai-1: Working with suppliers to 
ensure they are aware of changes to 
regulations and possible stocking 
options. 
Wai-3: Working closely with 
MHRA to ensure products will be 
compliant with regulations. 
Wai-4: Examining continuity of 
supply to health providers and the 
Brexit implications for this. 
WAIT-AND-SEE STRATEGY [B]: 
Wai-1: Working with suppliers to ensure they are aware of 
changes to regulations and possible stocking options. 
Wai-3: Working closely with MHRA to ensure products 
will be compliant with regulations. 
Wai-4: Examining continuity of supply to health providers 
and the Brexit implications for this. 
 
REACTIVE STRATEGY [B]: 
Rea-1: Starting to stockpile products. 
 
PROACTIVE STRATEGY [B]:  
WAIT-AND-SEE STRATEGY: 
Wai-1: Working with suppliers to ensure they have 
additional stocks and are aware of changes to 
regulations. 
Wai-3: Working closely with MHRA to ensure products 
will be compliant with regulations. 
Wai-4: Emergency planning for healthcare providers 
involving local weekly meetings. 
 
REACTIVE STRATEGY: 
Rea-1: Increased stocks of products with additional 
replenishment orders in place to maintain this. 
Size 
Time Period 
Long Term Medium Term Short Term 
23rd June 2016 to 18th Nov 2017 18th Nov 2017 to 29th Nov 2018 30th Nov 2018 to 31st Jan 2020 
 Pro-3: Establishing extra warehouses to accommodate 
stockpiling. 
 
 
Rea-4: Established new air freight route from Maastricht 
to Birmingham; suppliers are prepared to use air freight 
where necessary. 
Rea-5: Expanding on ability to deal with short-term 
customer requirements that might need an exceptional 
response. 
Rea-6: Putting right contingency plans in place to deal 
with short term challenges. 
 
PROACTIVE STRATEGY:  
Pro-3: Established extra warehouses to accommodate 
stockpiling. 
LRG3 No interview evidence WAIT-AND-SEE STRATEGY [B]: 
Wai-2: Receiving information from the government on 
preparedness and compliance with EU pharmaceutical 
regulations. 
Wai-3: Attending meetings held by Pharmaceutical 
Association of Great Britain, who lobby the government. 
 
WAIT-AND-SEE STRATEGY: 
Wai-2: Receiving information from the government on 
preparedness and compliance with EU pharmaceutical 
regulations. 
Wai-3: Attending meetings held by Pharmaceutical 
Association of Great Britain, who lobby the government. 
Wai-4: Establishing plan to deal with the various Tariff 
scenarios on products and raw materials imported from 
the EU. 
 
REACTIVE STRATEGY: 
Rea-1: Stockpiled finished products imported from the 
EU. 
Size 
Time Period 
Long Term Medium Term Short Term 
23rd June 2016 to 18th Nov 2017 18th Nov 2017 to 29th Nov 2018 30th Nov 2018 to 31st Jan 2020 
SME1 WAIT-AND-SEE STRATEGY: 
Wai-3: Providing information and 
feedback to the ABPI. 
Wai-4: Developing a report on the 
worst-case scenario and the 
operational and financial 
implications, considering whether 
product needs to be made earlier. 
 
WAIT-AND-SEE STRATEGY: 
Wai-1: Suppliers are completing questionnaires on their 
risk mitigation approaches. Talking to logistics provider 
about contingencies on product export to EU. 
Wai-2: Tracking Brexit statements being issued by ABPI. 
Wai-4: All the departments in the Brexit taskforce have got 
actions, so dispatch is looking at the extra customs forms.  
 
REACTIVE STRATEGY: 
Rea-1: Building stock of licensed products and aiming to 
ship them to the EU before the end of March 2019. 
Rea-5: Appointed a UK QPPV (in addition to an EU one) 
who looks after pharmacovigilance. Changing 
manufacturing authorisation licences with our affiliates to 
make sure that they're EU-owned. Identified a qualified 
person in the EU for releasing products. 
 
PROACTIVE STRATEGY:  
Pro-3: Establishing new cold stores in Spain and building 
laboratories. 
WAIT-AND-SEE STRATEGY [F]: 
Wai-1: Chasing suppliers (especially EU) to complete 
questionnaires on their risk mitigation approaches. 
Talking to logistics provider about contingencies on 
product export to EU. 
Wai-2: Tracking Brexit statements being issued by 
ABPI. 
Wai-4: All the departments in the Brexit taskforce have 
got actions, so dispatch are looking at the extra customs 
forms. 
 
REACTIVE STRATEGY [F]: 
Rea-1: Building stock of licensed products and aiming to 
ship them to the EU before the end of March 2019. 
PROACTIVE STRATEGY [F]:  
Pro-3: Establishing new cold stores in Spain and 
building laboratories. 
 
 
 
SME2 
 
PASSIVE STRATEGY: 
Pas-1: No change in strategy, 
business model or anything else. 
Pas-3: Don’t feel any impact and 
business carries on as usual. 
 
WAIT-AND-SEE STRATEGY: 
Wai-3: Following the chemical industry association. 
Wai-4: Investigating agreements required to export from 
the UK to the EU after Brexit.  
 
WAIT-AND-SEE STRATEGY [F]: 
Wai-3: Following the chemical industry association. 
Wai-4: Investigating agreements required to export from 
the UK to the EU after Brexit. 
Table 4: The coding results and the different strategies used by firms over the long, medium and short term. 
 
 
 
4.1 The strategy formulation and implementation process for Multi National Enterprises 
Table 4 illustrates that the MNEs in our study formulated strategy by first identifying 
resource slack and then applying it to the Brexit planning process. An expert informant from 
a UK pharmaceutical standards agency explained how MNEs had re-allocated tens of 
millions of pounds towards Brexit contingency planning: 
 
“I was at an industry meeting just last week and spoke to one of the big major 
multinationals, UK-based. And they've already put aside a contingency spend of £50 
million to cover Brexit expenses” - Head of Pharmaceutical Standards (EXP3) 19th 
 October 2017. 
 
As part of the strategy formulation process, MNE1 and MNE3 established a ‘Brexit task 
force’, comprised of senior managers from Public Relations, Operations, Finance, and 
Human Resources. The remit of the task force was to develop a high-level strategy that 
contained contingency plans for managing a no-deal Brexit. The Global Operations and 
Change Director at MNE3 explains how the strategy formulation process began:  
 
“Immediately after the vote, we got a group of thinkers together who had enough 
seniority to deal with the possibility and the ambiguity and the lack of certainty over 
Brexit and enough operational expertise to really understand in what way were we 
dependent on membership to the EU” - Global Operations & Change Director 
(MNE3a)  2nd October 2018. 
 
The task forces at MNE1 and MNE3 adopted a similar approach to strategy formulation; 
using worst-case assumptions during the planning process. According to interviewees, the 
worst-case outcome of Brexit was to leave the EU without a deal and for cross-border trade 
to revert to the World Trade Organization (WTO) terms. By trading under WTO terms, new 
tariff and non-tariff barriers would arise, new quality control checks would be required in 
the UK and the EU, and significant delays would occur at UK and EU ports of entry. The 
worst-case scenario planning approach is summarised by the Global Operations and Change 
Director at MNE3 as follows: 
 
 “We've taken a worst-case assumption. From day one we've assumed full WTO 
conditions; we've assumed a full failure of the import-export simplifications that are 
currently available in the EU. We've assumed full customs and regulatory frictions 
on the way in, on the way through, and on the way out of the EU. We're setting 
ourselves up for the worst case, no implementation period… and that's been our 
consistent underpinning company position. No patient left behind. Plan for the 
worst, hope for the best” - Global Operations & Change Director (MNE3a) 2nd 
October 2018. 
 
These findings were supported by an article in the Economist dated 28th November 2017, 
which states:  
“Pharmaceutical firms on both sides of the English Channel warn that time is 
running out for the EU and Britain to reach an agreement that allows them to 
continue without significant issues after March 2019. Companies would need several 
years to adjust if such a deal were not made. Even agreement on a transition period, 
to smooth the first years after Brexit may come too late to be of use to an industry 
with long production timelines. Firms are thus already preparing for a worst-case-
scenario outcome in which no deal is reached and Britain operates outside of the 
EU’s medicine regulations and customs union.” (The Economist, 2017).  
 
The Head of Global Logistics and Warehousing at MNE1 explained that by formulating 
their strategy based on the worst-case assumptions, his company was able to accept that 
Brexit would happen, and treat the eventual disruption as an operational issue, instead of an 
impending risk. While the worst-case scenario planning required significant tangible 
(money, infrastructure) and intangible (time, information gathering) resources, it meant his 
company could reduce, and even eliminate, the perceptions of heightened supply chain 
uncertainty surrounding Brexit: 
 
“We don't have uncertainty because of the assumptions that we've made. So, we have 
assumed World Trade Organisation and non-mutual recognition of quality 
standards. You're talking risk management, I'm seeing this now as issue 
management, so it's going to happen” - Head of Global Logistics and Warehousing 
(MNE1) 26th May 2017. 
 
Initially, MNE2 focused on gathering knowledge about the external business 
environment, which we coded as a wait-and-see strategy. It did not adopt a 
reactive/proactive strategy until the medium term. The Supply Chain Director from MNE2 
suggested that Brexit was not treated as a strategic priority from the outset because his 
company is not headquartered in the UK, and the UK is a relatively small global market. 
We found that, in the longer-term, all three MNEs gathered detailed data on the capacity of 
their warehouses and distribution facilities, ports of entry, lead times, and quantities of 
buffer stock. At the same time, the MNEs voiced their concerns to pharmaceutical trade 
associations, supplying them with relevant supply chain data to influence the negotiating 
position of UK policy makers. The Supply Chain Director at MNE2 explained the 
information gathering and dissemination process as follows:  
 
 
“We will spend most of the next year [2019] involved in lobby groups and various 
government and industry committees, trying to shape what Brexit looked like for the 
industry. What we have seen from the government is that they are trying to collect 
hard data around the impact of an absolute hard Brexit, and how ready is UK Plc. 
So, we've had to submit a lot of data around inventory levels, physical location of 
inventory, you know, and import plans post-March next year” - Supply Chain 
Director EMEA (MNE2a) 4th October 2018. 
 
Having gathered sufficient information and made their planning assumptions, the MNEs 
then began to implement their respective strategies. In the medium-term, all three MNEs 
exhibited elements of a reactive approach; accumulating and redeploying variable assets 
throughout the supply chain. For example, all three MNEs accumulated surplus inventory 
in accordance with their overarching Brexit strategy and to comply with demands from the 
UK government to hold a minimum of six weeks stock of all manufactured products:  
 
“We've now been asked specifically to carry an extra six weeks' inventory of every 
product. We've gone back and negotiated on that because some of our products we 
actually had six months inventory anyway, so we've had a more intelligent 
discussion and the Department of Health have endorsed our plans on that” - Supply 
Chain Director EMEA (MNE2a) 4th October 2018. 
 
At the same time, all of the MNEs exhibited evidence of deploying tangible resources 
proactively. For example MNE1 invested in a new UK warehouse for the storage and 
distribution of pharmaceutical products for UK customers: 
 
“From the end of this year [2018] we are going to have a warehouse setup in the UK 
within which we are going to store the product for UK patients. The French 
warehouse is going to lose the UK inventory, but what we're going to do in France 
is we're going to have to do sampling of product that is made in the UK and is 
destined for the EU 27” - Head of Global Logistics and Warehousing (MNE1) 5th 
October 2018. 
 
MNE2 and MNE3 also exhibited elements of a proactive strategy in the medium term. 
For example, MNE3 purchased a new customs bonded facility in the UK to hold and clear 
medicines imported from the EU:  
“What we've also done is procured importation clearance capacity in the UK - a 
bonded facility where you would hold medicine and clear it when it arrives. That 
importation clearance capacity is pretty limited, so that was one of our earlier 
securities that we needed to bag the available capacity while it was there” - Global 
Operations & Change Director (MNE3a) 2nd October 2018. 
 
MNE2 proactively established a new Quality Processing Hub and a new Qualified 
Person (QP) in Ireland to handle all of the quality approvals and releases for medicines sold 
within the EU 27 countries. 
 
4.2 The strategy formulation and implementation process for Large Companies 
The primary difference between the MNEs and large companies in our study was found in 
the strategy formulation process. Specifically, large companies did not immediately form 
task forces, nor did they follow a worst-case scenario planning approach. In the longer term, 
large companies followed a wait-and-see strategy only, gathering information by building 
relationships with regulatory bodies and working with trade associations, as explained by 
the CEO of Supply Chain Operations at LRG2: 
 
“We have, from the beginning, worked very closely with MHRA [Medicines and 
Healthcare products Regulatory Agency], which is the regulator on medical devices, 
medicines. And we are meeting very frequently with trade associations across the 
health system, and we're working very well together and the communications are 
open” - CEO of Supply Chain Operations (LRG2a) 14th March 2019. 
 
The large companies spent significant intangible resources (management time) on 
gathering information from existing suppliers to determine their ability to provide continuity 
of supply, and any expected changes to pricing structures.  
 
“Two weeks ago, organised by one of our 3PLs [third party logistics companies], 
we had a logistics board where the heads of logistics from the different companies 
come together with their experts. And there, we had a specific section purely on 
Brexit…at a really detailed level” - Supply Chain Director (LRG1a) 26th October 
2018. 
 
 
These quotes show that the strategy formulation process for large companies was based 
primarily on knowledge gathering exercises. Large firms waited until they had sufficient 
information before investing in any tangible resources. An interview with the supply chain 
director at LRG1 on 26th October 2018 revealed that his company implemented a reactive 
strategy alongside their wait-and-see strategy as the original Brexit date (29th March 2019) 
was fast approaching:  
 
“We have positioned buffer stocks… we also made sure we have capacity to make 
products... and ensured that we have supply close by so we can react very quickly. 
So it's not just a wait-and-see approach anymore” - Supply Chain Director (LRG1a) 
26th October 2018. 
 
Similarly LRG2 also embarked on a reactive strategy alongside the wait-and-see 
approach, while LRG3 followed a wait-and-see strategy in the medium and a reactive 
strategy in the short-term, as evidenced by an interview with the Director of Supply Chain 
and Procurement at LRG3: 
 
“So in supply chain, we decided to put a plan in place to stockpile finished product 
that we purchase from within the European Union. So we decided to take action on 
the finished product because we thought that that might be a bigger risk in terms of 
regulatory and customs issues” - Director of Supply Chain and Procurement (LRG3) 
25th January 2019. 
 
The delayed reactive strategy by LRG3 and the absence of any proactive strategy could 
be explained by its size being very close to the threshold for the SME category. The other 
large companies, LRG1 and LRG2, followed a mix of reactive and proactive strategies 
through the medium- and short-term. For example, LRG2 built buffer stock and added extra 
capacity to its transportation network (reactive), whilst building new warehouses to store 
the buffer stock (proactive). Similarly, LRG1 increased its inventory buffers and worked 
with third party logistics providers to secure more vehicle space (reactive), while 
simultaneously identifying new sources of supply in the EU for European customers 
(proactive). During the strategy implementation phase, the large companies in our study 
continued to gather knowledge on the risks posed by Brexit using a wait-and-see approach, 
while simultaneously investing in tangible resources as part of a reactive and proactive 
approach. These findings indicate that, in the medium- to short-term, large firms do not 
follow a distinct strategy but a mix of wait-and-see, reactive and proactive strategies.  
 
4.3 The strategy formulation and implementation process for SMEs 
The SMEs in our study followed either a passive or a wait-and-see strategy in the longer 
term due to resource constraints. The Operations Director at SME1 explained how her 
company was undertaking knowledge-gathering exercises with suppliers: 
 
“We needed to find out more about what our suppliers were doing to mitigate Brexit. 
So we've done questionnaires to them… Some have come back saying they're 
looking in to it, others haven't come back at all, so we're just really in the process of 
chasing those all up” - Operations Director (SME1) 27th September 2017. 
 
She explained that her team was contacting local business councils, Members of 
Parliament, and pharmaceutical trade associations for more information on Brexit:  
 
“We’ve been lobbying through the Council who've got representatives, and I've 
written to our local MP. There's the [Pharma Trade Association] who we don't 
belong to, but they've been putting statements out into the press… so we're keeping 
abreast of various organisations and their campaigns” - Operations Director (SME1) 
27th September 2017. 
 
During the second interview with SME1 (9th October 2018), the Operations Director 
explained that her company had started to make tangible resource commitments by building 
buffer inventory (reactive) and expanding its European production facility (proactive) to sell 
directly to European customers. The interview findings suggest that the implementation of 
both reactive and proactive strategies at SME1, in addition to the existing wait-and-see 
approach, was prompted by shortening time horizons in the lead up to the initial Brexit 
leaving date (31st March 2019). SME1 has 450 employees, putting it on the cusp of the 
“large” categorisation of firms; this likely explains why it followed a strategy formulation 
and dissemination process similar to those followed by large firms in our study.  
SME2, which is considerably smaller than SME1 with 150 employees and much lower 
revenue, followed a passive strategy in the long term whilst transitioning into a wait-and-
see strategy in the medium to short term - gathering information but not making any tangible 
resource commitments. During an interview with the CEO from SME2 on 4th October 2017, 
she explained that: “As far as I see it we don't have any strategy….I don't think there is very 
much change in business model or in sales strategies”. During a follow-up interview a year 
later (5th October 2018), she explained how her company moved to a wait-and-see strategy 
prompted by pharmaceutical trade associations asking their members to be prepared for 
Brexit.  
 
“It was in the summer actually… That's when this news came around and all these 
industry networks started to bring out press releases and talk about this [Brexit], and 
asked their member companies 'please come on, get prepared'” - CEO (SME2) 5th 
October 2018. 
 
She went on to explain that while her company was actively gathering information, they 
were not going to make any tangible investments in new facilities, equipment or stock until 
the exact nature of the Brexit divorce bill was clarified. An excerpt from the Economist of 
2nd February 2019 explains the predicament in which SMEs found themselves:  
“No-deal planning is expensive, and many of Britain’s 5.7m small and medium 
companies are loath to invest in something that may never happen. In a recent poll 
by the Institute of Directors, which mainly represents smaller firms, 40% said they 
would not do anything until “the new relationship between the UK and the EU is 
completely clear.” (The Economist, 2019b).  
SME2 fits nicely into the Economist’s description, as it is heavily resource constrained 
and unable to make investments until the exact nature of the UK-EU trading partnership 
was known. However, we did not find evidence of companies following a passive, do-
nothing approach over the medium and short term. Instead, all companies conducted some 
form of knowledge gathering activity and did not sit idly by waiting for the event to 
materialise. We now discuss these findings in relation to the existing literature to arrive at a 
framework for managing supply chain uncertainty and risk arising from geopolitical 
disruptions.  
 
5. Discussion 
Returning to Milliken’s (1987) definition of uncertainty, we suggest that supply chain 
uncertainty is a matter of perception, and such perceptions can be changed during the 
strategy formulation process. All of the firms in our study, except the smallest (SME2), 
followed a wait-and-see strategy in the longer term; collecting information from supply 
chain partners and disseminating this information to policy makers. We therefore class wait-
and-see as a preliminary strategy used to gather information and reduce perceived levels of 
heightened supply chain uncertainty. Once supply chain uncertainty was perceived to be at 
tolerable levels, the managers in our study implemented reactive and/or proactive strategies 
to manage supply chain risks. Here we find support for the assertion of Knight (1921) and 
March and Shapira (1987) that risk is a consequence of uncertainty and not a substitute for 
it. Our findings indicate that deploying intangible resources to reduce perceptions of 
heightened supply chain uncertainty and deploying tangible resources to mitigate supply 
chain risks are two important conditions when attempting to achieve strategic fit with the 
external business environment. This leads us to propose the following:  
 
Proposition 1: Perceptions of heightened supply chain uncertainty can be reduced 
to tolerable levels during the strategy formulation process by deploying intangible 
resources to gather and disseminate supply chain knowledge.  
 
Proposition 2: Perceptions of heightened supply chain uncertainty need to be 
reduced to tolerable levels before a firm will invest in tangible resources to mitigate 
supply chain risks. 
 
Our findings reinforce the assertion of Zajac et al. (2000) that achieving strategic fit with 
the external business environment is an organisationally and temporally unique process, 
rather than being common across many organisations in a given context. The contingency 
variables examined in our study, strategic context and firm size, shed some light on the 
different approaches for achieving strategic fit. The strategic context examined in our study 
(Brexit) changed over time as politicians repeatedly attempted to reach a deal over the terms 
of the EU exit bill. However, while the nature of the strategic context changed, it was 
fundamentally the same strategic context faced by all firms in our study. It was the 
contingency variable of firm size, and correlated levels of resource slack, that affected the 
strategies for fit used by our case companies when faced with the same strategic context. A 
key difference between the MNEs and the relatively more resource constrained large firms 
and SMEs in our study, was that the MNE1 and MNE3 used their slack resources (money 
and management time) to form task forces and develop a series of worst-case planning 
assumptions. These findings support Cyert and March’s (2013) assertion that resource slack 
provides discretionary resources for managers in the face of unexpected environmental 
shifts and the resulting uncertainty that this creates. 
By using worst-case assumptions during the strategy formulation process, MNE1 and 
MNE3 were able to reduce perceived levels of uncertainty surrounding Brexit within their 
respective organisations. The Supply Chain Director at MNE1 explained that “Due to our 
worst-case approach, Brexit is no longer a risk to us…we are treating it as an issue that 
needs to be managed like all of the other day-to-day issues that we encounter”. Specifically, 
embedding worst case assumptions in the strategy formulation process focused management 
efforts on preparing for the worst possible outcome, with any other outcome providing 
benefits to the organisation. This leads us to propose that:  
 
Proposition 3: Perceptions of heightened supply chain uncertainty can be reduced 
to tolerable levels by embedding worst case scenario planning assumptions in the 
strategy formulation process  
 
The SCRM literature primarily focuses on the strategy implementation phase, or how 
companies deploy tangible resources to mitigate supply chain risks (Ambulkar et al., 2015; 
Craighead et al., 2007). An implicit assumption of much of the SCRM literature is that 
companies will follow a distinct type of strategy (passive, reactive, proactive) when 
attempting to manage supply chain disruptions (Chopra and Sodhi, 2004; Grotsch et al., 
2013; Simangunsong et al., 2012). For example, Thun et al. (2011) found that SMEs 
managed supply chain risks by building up redundancies (safety stock, overcapacity) to 
reduce the severity of the risk event (a reactive approach), while large companies attempted 
to reduce the possibility that the disruptive event would occur (a proactive strategy). 
Ellegaard (2008) found that small companies followed a passive approach as they avoided 
negotiating multi-sourcing contracts and did not build redundancies because of resource 
constraints.  
Our study revealed a more nuanced approach by firms, where companies often blurred 
the lines between wait-and-see, reactive, and proactive strategies; deploying multiple 
strategies concurrently. For example, the smallest company in our study (SME2) followed 
a passive strategy in the long term, and then moved to a wait-and-see strategy in the medium 
and short term. This finding is in contrast with Ellegaard (2008), who suggested that small 
firms would not gather market intelligence or build new supplier relationships. We found 
that a passive strategy can transition into a wait-and-see strategy. Also, we found a wait-
and-see strategy can co-exist with reactive and proactive strategies without any definitive 
transition being made. Indeed, all of the companies in our study followed more than one 
strategy for managing supply chain risks and these strategies changed over time. This leads 
to our fourth proposition: 
 
Proposition 4: Supply chain risk management strategies will often co-exist and will 
change over time as perceptions of supply chain uncertainty reduce to tolerable 
levels. 
 
Drawing together these propositions, we now advance an empirically informed model 
of strategies for managing the supply chain uncertainty that arises from geopolitical events 
(see Figure 2). 
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Figure 2: Empirically informed framework: strategies for managing supply chain 
uncertainty and supply chain risk for companies of different sizes 
 
 
6. Contribution, limitations and areas for future research  
6.1 Theoretical contribution 
This study contributes to strategic contingency theory by exploring the interaction between 
the contingency variables of firm size and strategic context. By conducting a longitudinal 
study of the Brexit phenomenon, we gathered evidence to show that as a strategic context 
changes, a firm’s strategy to achieve fit with the external business environment will also 
change, but not necessarily at the same time nor in the same manner. The study elaborates 
on strategic contingency theory by identifying two conditions needed to achieve strategic 
fit with an external environment disrupted by a geopolitical event: first, deploying intangible 
resources (management time, knowledge gathering activities) to reduce perceptions of 
heightened supply chain uncertainty and, second, deploying tangible resources (supply 
chain redundancies, new supply chain assets) to mitigate the negative outcomes of supply 
chain risks. 
By using worst-case assumptions during the strategy formulation process, the MNEs in 
our study reduced perceived levels of heightened supply chain uncertainty surrounding 
Brexit. Once supply chain uncertainty was perceived to be tolerable, the MNE and large 
firms in our study deployed tangible resources using reactive and proactive strategies to 
reduce the severity of supply chain risks. The smallest company in our study (SME2) 
exhibited evidence of a strategic misfit in the longer to medium term when the geopolitical 
landscape changed and they did not, or could not, change in response due to resource 
constraints.  
Our findings contribute to the literature by building the argument that supply chain 
uncertainty antecedes supply chain risk. We challenge an implicit assumption that firms will 
adopt either a passive, reactive, or proactive strategy and follow this strategy through to 
completion (Grotsch et al., 2013; Knemeyer et al., 2009). Our findings suggest that 
strategies for managing supply chain uncertainty, and subsequently supply chain risk, often 
co-exist and change over time as the nature of the external business environment alters. This 
contribution builds on important theoretical work underway in the OM literature about the 
application of contingency theory in a supply chain context (Cousins et al., 2019; Flynn et 
al., 2016; Walker et al., 2015). 
 
6.2 Managerial Contribution 
Managers are provided with a framework for managing the supply chain uncertainty and 
subsequent risks that arise from geopolitical disruptions. SCRM scholars have examined 
how companies manage supply chain risks arising from natural disasters (Elluru et al., 
2017), terrorist attacks (Knemeyer et al., 2009), supplier insolvencies (Thun and Hoenig, 
2011), and financial crises (Blome and Schoenherr, 2011). However, they have paid much 
less attention to the disruptive nature of geopolitical events. This is a noteworthy omission 
because geopolitical events, such as elections and regime changes, often impact multiple 
aspects of the supply chain (Hendry et al., 2019). Political disputes can restrict access to 
personnel and, in extreme cases, shut down transportation and distribution networks, such 
as the protests that brought Hong Kong to a halt in 2019 (The Economist, 2019a). Trade 
disputes, such as the one between the USA and China in 2018/19, can dramatically increase 
the price of raw materials (i.e., steel and aluminium) and influence the competitiveness of 
firms in home markets (Financial Times, 2019).  
The SCRM literature calls on supply chain managers to act proactively by investing in 
risk detection and market intelligence programmes, or reactively by investing in excess 
stock, dual suppliers, and redundant supply chain infrastructure (Chopra and Sodhi, 2004; 
Jüttner et al., 2003; Thun et al., 2011). We suggest that managers may also want to consider 
a wait-and-see strategy in the first instance to reduce perceptions of heightened supply chain 
uncertainty before making costly and difficult to reverse tangible resource commitments.  
 
6.3 Limitations and Future Research Directions 
The findings from this study should be viewed in light of its limitations. Rather than 
statistical generalisation, we aimed for the theoretical generalisation of our findings (Yin, 
2014). Our findings informed four propositions and an empirical framework, which 
elaborated on strategic contingency theory. We call on future researchers to use other 
research methodologies, such as surveys or questionnaires, to test our propositions. Further, 
our study is limited to an examination of the pharmaceutical industry, which has unique 
characteristics including a direct impact on human life, as well as strong regulatory 
oversight. As pharmaceutical companies are dealing with lifesaving medications, they are 
required to hold certain levels of inventory and have accredited processes (Good 
Manufacturing Practices), whereas other industries may not have the same compliance 
issues. Compliance with regulatory regimes means that pharmaceutical companies may take 
significant time to implement new strategies for managing supply chain risks. We encourage 
future researchers to examine the validity of our propositions in other industries, such as 
aerospace or automotive, which have different regulatory regimes and stakeholders. 
Furthermore, our paper examined a geopolitical event (Brexit) that has a unique set of 
properties and affects companies in distinct ways. Future researchers could examine other 
geopolitical events that have a defined set of outcomes (i.e., elections), versus those that are 
unplanned and have an undefinable set of outcomes (i.e., war, terrorism, riots). By 
examining our propositions in the context of geopolitical events with unknowable outcomes, 
future research can identify the strategies that firms use when attempting to manage pure 
uncertainty. Finally, we suggest a potentially fruitful area of future research is an 
examination of how companies of various sizes create resource slack, be it tangible or 
intangible resources, and then deploy slack resources to achieve fit with the external 
environment
36 
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